

Understanding livelihoods in northern Syria: how people are coping with repeated shocks, constant change and an uncertain future



An assessment using a Household Economy Approach and hazard mapping to better understand livelihoods in northern Syria

January 2015

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Four years of deadly conflict inside Syria have impacted on every aspect of individual's lives from the destruction of their homes, to the denial of basic services such as healthcare and education, to an erosion of people's ability to access sufficient food. The direct and indirect effects of the conflict have also had – increasingly – severe impacts on livelihoods and incomes, which in turn is exacerbating the dire humanitarian situation of families and their children. While humanitarian actors are providing assistance inside Syria, even in an increasingly challenging context, the situation for children in Syria continues to deteriorate and the window of opportunity to build families' resilience to withstand future shocks is rapidly depleting.

To date the impact of humanitarian assistance provided in Syria has been compromised by limited information and analysis of the context in which families are living and their ability to cope with the changing situation. As a result the scope of interventions to support families' livelihoods has been limited and the majority of focus has been on providing immediate assistance with little emphasis on bolstering coping mechanisms to help communities adapt to future shocks. In order to develop a more comprehensive and strategic response to support communities, Save the Children carried out a livelihoods analysis in northern Syria in November 2014 in order to review the appropriate options for immediate and medium-term livelihoods interventions as well as making needs-based recommendations for food assistance moving forward.

The assessment used the core principles of the household economy approach (HEA) adapting it to enable easier usage through remote technical support and covered two distinct groups, IDPs and host communities. The assessment involved wealth ranking, analysis of commodity volume and price in markets, and an overview of household food, income and expenditure sources as well as capturing the shocks and the relative vulnerability of different groups, with the aim of analysing the risks and opportunities for communities in northern Syria in terms of their ability to access livelihood opportunities and sufficient food.

The context for livelihoods and markets in northern Syria is complex and changing, and as such different people are being affected in different ways, at different times, by different shocks and to varying degrees. Although understanding community livelihoods strategies is always nuanced, mapping and interpreting livelihoods and markets in a context of continued displacement and conflict is especially difficult. This, coupled with the collapse of an economy which provided heavy subsidies, guaranteed purchase prices, access to productive assets and job security to a large percentage of the population, has led to very complex adaptation methods that are continuing to change over time.

Communities in the areas assessed within this study have experienced the direct and indirect consequences of conflict, as well as other shocks to their livelihoods such as crop disease and hyper-inflation. As a result there has been mass movement and displacement of people, the failure of crops, disruption to markets and a dramatic shrinking of labour opportunities. Volatile prices are the result of a combination of hyper-inflation, changes to demand, increased imports and reduced physical access to markets. Whilst some individuals are still able engage in trade and salaries for those who are still receiving them have increased, the benefit of these positive changes is immediately undermined by the reduction in labour opportunities and the spiralling cost of household costs, most notably food.

Analysis of the changes in household income and expenditure over time highlights a reduction in income across all wealth groups as well as highlighting families' reduced purchasing power as a result of inflation on all core commodities. As this assessment shows, as the crisis has continued people and markets have continued to adapt. However the ability of households to capitalise on the opportunities presented by the emerging markets and new opportunities require a level of skill and financial capital that many of the poorest households do not have, and as such there are early indications that poor households are getting poorer. Even amongst the better off households, most coping strategies have been exhausted and stresses on families' income and expenditure is continuing to increase. As a result there has been a marked increase in the use of negative coping strategies in the last year ranging from the sale of productive assets to the

engagement of children in labour, rising rates of early marriage and the engagement of individuals – including children - with armed groups across all wealth groups.

As this report notes, current humanitarian assistance is vital for families and without this support the poorest families would not be able to meet even their basic food needs, and it is the finding of this study that the very poor are now entirely dependent on aid. This report also highlights however the risk that a lack of focus by the humanitarian community on meaningful adaptation and livelihoods opportunities is undermining the potential resilience at the household level. As people exhaust coping strategies and continue to deplete productive assets, this report recommends a shift in focus from the ‘one size fits all’ model that exemplifies the current response to a two tiered approach to humanitarian action. The first tier being one of prioritised and targeted access to immediate goods and services, and the second a focus on working with conflict affected households to promote opportunities for livelihoods, labour and integrated market activities.

The scope of this report is such that it is intended as a snapshot of the situation in northern Syria not a comprehensive analysis. As such a key recommendation is that further analysis take place with a particular focus on labour markets, and that

improved efforts to involve communities and decision makers inside Syria must be prioritised to improve the appropriateness and sustainability of programme planning.



Summary recommendations

- 1. Strengthen agricultural productivity:** by providing temporary labour opportunities, delivering of agricultural inputs, supporting communities to identify new economic activities and repairing damaged infrastructure such as irrigation systems.
- 2. Capitalise on the skills gap in new market opportunities:** by supporting up-skilling for poor households, providing grants to middle households to maximise labour opportunities, and planning for the gap in tertiary education and vocational skills for young people by supporting alternative skills training opportunities.
- 3. Ensure parallel tracks of immediate assistance and longer-term support:** assistance to very poor households should continue and increase in value to decrease negative and harmful coping strategies, poor households should be provided with more targeted food assistance and should be phased to reduce dependency, livelihoods analysis and market analysis should be strengthened to identify emerging opportunities for business development, which can be supported by humanitarian and development actors.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Save the Children would like to thank the two organisations, Khayr and Violet, who supported in the collection of data for the assessment on which this report is based.



Khayr is a humanitarian organisation that provides relief aid and the basic needs for the people and communities affected by the Syria crisis and helps secure a better future for them. Khayr provides aid in the fields of Food Security and Livelihood, Non-Food Items, Water Sanitation and Hygiene, and health for vulnerable people affected by the Syria crisis in Syria, Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan.



Violet is a non-profit, non-governmental organization providing humanitarian relief to the Syrian people. It was established in 2011 and has projects in Syria and Turkey providing IDPs and refugees with medical assistance, food and NFI distributions, protection services and education.

Save the Children Syria Country Office would also like to acknowledge and thank Mohamed Addum, Rosie Jackson and the Save the Children Syria Response Food Security and Livelihoods team for their hard work in conducting the assessment and preparing this report.

For more information about the assessment, the findings of this report or Save the Children's Food Security and Livelihoods work inside Syria please contact: Jenny Weatherall – jennifer.weatherall@savethechildren.org

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INTRODUCTION

The crisis in Syria is now in its fourth year and the humanitarian situation on the ground continues to deteriorate; an estimated 12.2 million people are now in need of humanitarian assistance, and half of all Syrians have been forced from their homes with 7.6 million internally displaced¹. With no end in sight to the crisis families are facing multiple and growing challenges and stresses, while their coping mechanisms are eroding by the day. Multiple displacements, instability, disruption to agriculture and livelihoods, hyper-inflation and the destruction of infrastructure have combined to create a situation where families are finding it increasingly difficult to support themselves and access sufficient food.

Before the start of the conflict eight million Syrians earned their living from farming but since the start of the conflict the agricultural sector has been decimated, suffering nearly \$2 billion USD worth of losses² as fields have been left unattended due to conflict and displacement, equipment has been looted, and power cuts and a lack of fuel to run equipment have prevented people from planting and harvesting. This, combined with a serious drought meant that the rural belt of northern Syria, previously the nation's breadbasket, experienced its worst harvest of 30 years in 2013³.

The erosion of the agricultural sector coupled with other impacts of the conflict mean inflation of food prices has now reached 100%⁴ at the same time that the majority of the population no longer has an income. The looting and destruction of Syrian businesses both large and small compounded by rapid de-industrialisation and capital flight mean that Syria's GDP contracted by more than 30% each quarter of the last fiscal year⁵, and with no end to the conflict in sight this trend looks set to continue. Consequently, in the first two years of the conflict alone 2.3 million people lost their jobs and there are now an estimated 7 million people who have been forced into poverty since the beginning of the crisis.

The depletion of food stocks, the spiralling cost of commodity prices and reduced income opportunities have eroded the ability of communities to cope with new shocks and the sustained crisis, which means that for the average Syrian family missing out on meals or not being able to buy food for prolonged periods is now a regular occurrence,⁶ with 79% of people reporting that they do not have enough food.⁷

The impact of this protracted crisis on children is devastating as the stresses on families' incomes and coping mechanisms is not only affecting children's food security but also impacting on their ability to access their basic rights to healthcare and education, and places them at increasing risk of serious child protection concerns such as child labour, early marriage and recruitment into armed groups.

The purpose of this report is to analyse some of the trends related to families' income and expenditure as they are being directly and indirectly affected by the conflict, and to make key recommendations for how humanitarian programming can be adjusted to better support communities' food security and livelihoods needs.



¹ http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2014/840

² FAO (2013) Joint Rapid Food Security Needs Assessment. Retrieved on 11th of July from: http://www.fao.org/giews/english/otherpub/JRFSNA_Syrian2012.pdf;

³ FAO (2013) Joint Rapid Food Security Needs Assessment. Retrieved on 11th of July from: http://www.fao.org/giews/english/otherpub/JRFSNA_Syrian2012.pdf

⁴ Food Security Snapshot, 28-January-

2014 <http://www.fao.org/giews/countrybrief/country.jsp?code=SyR>

⁵ The Syria Report online, <http://www.syria-report.com/>

⁶ Save the Children (2013). Hunger in a War Zone – The growing crisis behind the Syria conflict. Retrieved on July 11th from http://www.savethechildren.org/atf/cf/%7B9def2ebe-10ae-432c-9bd0-df91d2eba74a%7D/HUNGER_IN_A_WAR_ZONE.PDF

⁷ Ibid


BACKGROUND TO THE ASSESSMENT

• Purpose and scope

In October and November 2014 Save the Children and two partner organisations conducted an assessment in order to gain a better picture of how livelihoods have been impacted by the crisis in Syria, and identify the most appropriate immediate and medium-term responses to families' food security and livelihoods needs.

There is currently a considerable lack of information on the current livelihoods situation in Syria, and to date the international humanitarian response has largely focused on immediate food assistance. As humanitarian actors at all levels have acknowledged the need to invest more in protecting and re-establishing livelihoods, the intention of this assessment was to assist in the review of appropriate options for improved livelihood interventions as well as making needs-based recommendations for food assistance moving forward. It should be noted that this assessment focused on a relatively small geographical area of northern Syria and that the context across the country varies dramatically and is constantly changing, and therefore this report should therefore be read as a snapshot from which some broad conclusions and recommendations can be made.

To assist in analysis, a secondary data review was initially undertaken to understand the livelihoods characteristics in the areas where the assessment was to take place. While there appears to be no livelihood zoning description for Syria there are agro-ecological zoning maps for all of Syria produced by FAO⁸. This assessment was focused on Zone I (shown in dark green area on map I) that covers a large part of northern Syria including north-west and west Aleppo governorate, the majority of Idlib governorate, all of Latakia and Tartous governorates, and part of Homs and Hama governorates. The topography of this zone is a mix of mountainous areas and plains with an annual rainfall of between 350 and 600 mm. Farming is the dominant livelihood, with other livelihood activities including government/public service work and livestock husbandry/trading.



Map I: Agricultural zones of Syrian Arab Republic

Save the Children and its partners chose eight locations for field data collection, and with a focus on a representative sample rather than a statistically relevant sample, the assessment focused primarily on qualitative data collection. The selection of locations was limited to those areas where the field teams had physical access to due to the security situation, although Save the Children worked with two partner organisations in order to collect data from as wide a range of locations as possible.

Main Agriculture and Livestock Production	Descriptions
Main crops consumed:	Wheat, barley and legumes
Main crops sold (food or cash crops):	Wheat, barley and legumes in addition to cumin, vegetables and fodder crops. Olive and fruit trees are also grown in some villages including figs, grapes and pomegranates
Main livestock and livestock products consumed:	Chicken, eggs and milk products (cow, sheep and goat)
Main livestock and livestock products sold:	Sheep, goats, chickens and cows. Milk and eggs are the main livestock products that are also being sold.

Table I: Overview of agriculture and livestock production in assessment area

⁸<http://www.fao.org/docrep/005/Y4732E/y4732e06.htm>

• Assessment Methodology

The assessment was informed by *elements* of the Household Economy Approach (HEA)⁹ - which was developed in the early 1990s by Save the Children UK in order to improve the ability to predict short-term changes in access to food and has developed significantly since then – and the methodology and consisted of a series of household focus group discussions, interviews with key informants, community group work (developing seasonal calendars, and hazard and vulnerability timelines), key stakeholder work (to define wealth groups) and interviews with market traders.

Stakeholder group	Number of individuals
Governorates	2
Villages	8 ¹⁰
Household FGDs	30 (177 household representatives)
Key Informants	53 people
Work groups Hazard and vulnerability	8 groups (36 people)
Work groups seasonal calendar	38 people
Wealth Breakdown	9 groups
Market Traders	15 people
Community stakeholders	3 groups

Table 2: Summary of data collection methodology

A total of 370 community representatives from Aleppo and Idleb governorates participated in the assessment. These representatives were from both the host community and internally displaced populations. The displaced families were originally from both rural and urban areas but all participants were now living in rural or semi-rural areas. A mixture of qualitative and quantitative data was collected and recorded during the assessment and the analysis was supported by additional primary data from Save the Children's response monitoring and broader secondary data. Wealth ranking, and community mapping of seasonal trends, hazards and vulnerability

preceded the identification of key representatives from various wealth groups within the communities. The areas that were targeted during the assessment are largely rural areas where agriculture was the main livelihood option pre-crisis, and where significant numbers of internally displaced people (IDPs) have now settled as a result of the crisis.

Throughout this report reference will be made to two different representative resident populations: rural host and IDPs, and urban IDPs:

Rural host and IDPs: Encompasses rural communities hosting large numbers of IDPs, and to IDPs originating from rural areas who had broadly similar livelihood opportunities and activities prior to the conflict as the host communities they are now residing in.

Urban IDPs: Refers to IDPs originating from urban areas who had significantly different livelihood opportunities and activities prior to the crisis compared the first group, and are therefore also considered to have different opportunities in the current situation.

Rural Host and IDPs	Urban IDPs
Originating from rural areas	Originating from urban areas
Share capabilities	Specific capabilities and livelihood strategies
Better integrated into agricultural economy	Fewer physical assets

Table 3: Characteristics of two representative groups

The HEA methodology uses the triangulation of data sets from multiple sources and the collation of data identified across similar areas to build a picture of livelihoods strategies in a 'normal' year in order to compare to the present situation as a result of the crisis. The complex situation presented by the on-going and protracted crisis in Syria, meant that the assessment team worked with communities to adapt this methodology. This assessment is not considered to be a 'full HEA', nor was it intended to be. The

⁹ There are significant resources available publicly on the HEA methodology, for example: <http://www.savethechildren.org.uk/resources/online-library/practitioners%E2%80%99-guide-household-economy-approach>

¹⁰For security reasons specific locations where the assessment was carried out are not given in this report.

following amendments were made to the methodology and are discussed within the report:

- The data collected at a household level is not a complete HEA data set; the graphs presented in this report were built using the input of less detailed information than would normally be expected, and understanding this limitation is critical in understanding the applicability of the findings.
- The reference year refers to the first year of the crisis, rather than prior to the crisis
- Two separate groups were identified for the purpose of wealth ranking (rural host and IDPs; and urban IDPs)

Data was collected in the field by staff from three organisations with technical oversight and management of the assessment by a technical specialist based in southern Turkey. A three-day training was conducted for the field teams in southern Turkey between 31 October 2014 and 2 November 2014 which included an overview of key food security and livelihoods concepts, data collection methods, sampling, the livelihoods analysis framework of the HEA, and the rationale and objectives of the assessment. This was followed by the approach to the assessment, the geographical coverage, sampling of locations and respondents as well as finalising the assessment tools, establishing the reference year and providing full training on the methods to be used. Following the data collection, which took nine days, the field teams returned to Antakya for analysis and debriefing on 16 and 17 November 2014. Initial findings were presented with Save the Children's team and to other FSL partners on 24 and 25 November 2014.

• Reference year

A standard HEA uses a baseline reference period for the purpose of analysing the changes following a shock. Typically this reference period would refer to the most recent year that is deemed 'normal', i.e. not a good year and not a bad year. Given the protracted nature of the Syrian crisis, the length of time that has passed and the extraordinary changes to the national economy this assessment however instead chose a reference year at the beginning of the crisis period.

Through consultation with the assessment teams and key stakeholders the period of May 2011 to April 2012 was identified as the most recent 'normal year', and is thus used as the reference year. Although this year coincided with the start of the conflict little impact had been felt in the focus areas of the assessment and it had been a reasonable agriculture year. The reference year starts in May to coincide with the end of the main harvest.

• Wealth groups

Following a wealth ranking exercise conducted with the key informants, five wealth groups were identified by communities; the very poor (14%), poor (44%), middle income (25%), better off (12%) and rich (3%). The average household size across all wealth groups was six persons with a slightly higher average of 7.5 in the poorest and slight lower of five in the rich. In all wealth groups there were two income earners in the household during the reference year. The bulk of the population in the areas covered by this assessment – both rural host and IDPs, and urban IDPs - fall into the poor or middle income categories, with the very poor, better off and rich households very distinctively separated in the wealth grouping. For the purposes of this report, analysis has focused on three of the five groups; the very poor, poor and better-off wealth groups.

Very poor households own little to no land and very minimal livestock and other productive assets, relying almost exclusively on unskilled labour, both on- and off-farm, Zakat¹¹ and are most likely to engage in wood collection and the consumption of wild foods. Migration for labour was fairly common prior to the conflict, particularly to Lebanon during the cash cropping harvests.

Poor households tend to own land, small livestock and possibly productive assets. This group are likely to participate in share cropping as a source of food and income as well as petty trade on a seasonal basis. Still dependent on labour as a primary or secondary income, poor households are likely have access to

¹¹ Zakat is a form of taxation and wealth redistribution by those who can afford it and forms one of the 5 pillars of Islam

better paid work than the very poor and may also engage in skilled labour migration.

Middle-income households have similar agricultural practices to the poor households, although typically own around 50% more agricultural land and assets. This group are differentiated from the poor by income source, with increased engagement in trade, small business and self-employment activities. Due to the increased revenue, this group have accumulated additional assets that support income generation and provide revenue through rent.

The better-off, along with the rich households, provide the most economic opportunities for the poorest wealth groups in the area. Households in this wealth group farm irrigated land with varied cash and staple crops and are likely to own and run multiple medium to large scale businesses. They are well linked to national markets, better educated and were more likely to have left their areas of origin in the initial years of the conflict.

Rich households in the communities assessed own large portions of the land, up to 50% of which is rented either through share cropping or direct payment. This group have access to remittance, are employed full time and own multiple large businesses in agriculture and private enterprise. Their assets are spread between rural and urban areas, and they may be stakeholders in national enterprise.

- **Seasonal calendar (see Annex I)**

The main agriculture season for wheat and barley begins with planting in November/December and ends with the harvest in April. A number of other crops are also outlined on the calendar, all representing a sizeable contribution to household consumption.

Labour opportunities vary significantly depending on the season but are heavily focused around agriculture and migratory labour. In the case of the assessed communities, there is a strong correlation between the resumption of agriculture labour and the end of the lean season that is more typically associated the time immediately prior to harvest.

Trade is on-going throughout the year but peaks in the summer months of April to September, and is

associated with increased incomes and purchasing power following the harvest. There is also a specific increase in petty trade in winter including the sale of fuel and additional items associated with the cold weather. Most assets are purchased during the summer months and sold during the lean period as a coping strategy.




SITUATION IN THE REFERENCE YEAR

Food sources

a. Rural host and IDPs


According to the results of this assessment, at the start of the conflict 20% of the food consumed by all wealth groups was derived from their own production of cereals, and between 10 and 12% of food consumed came from their own livestock.



For the poor and very poor groups, 55% of their food was purchased from both regular and subsidised markets. While for the poor and better-off households home gardening of fresh vegetables provided a reasonable amount of their food needs, the very poor did not produce vegetables at home and made up for this loss through gifts from the community and Zakat.

a. Urban IDPs


During the reference year communities from urban areas sourced all their food through markets, with the exception of a small contribution of Zakat that was made to poor and very poor households that supplemented their food sources. Where around one-third of rural host and IDPs' food was previously derived from what they were able to produce themselves, this was not an option for urban IDPs.



Income sources

a. Rural host and IDPs


In contrast to the similarities in the sources of food across all wealth groups in the rural host and IDP group, the assessment found that at the start of the conflict there were significant differences in the income sources and livelihood opportunities for the very poor and better off households in the rural host and IDP group. This is illustrated by the dependency of the very poor on labour for income and the contribution to household income that came from the sale of assets, a practice that tended to coincide with the lean season and were thus an important safety-net for the poorest households. In addition, poor households would contribute to household incomes by accessing loans, selling surplus goods they produced and by engaging in petty trade.



The better off were previously involved in trade and business with most of their income coming from small businesses and self-employment. The sale of surplus agricultural and livestock goods contributed to around 25% of their income and they also had access to salaried work through the government and other skilled labouring opportunities.

• Urban IDPs

In the reference year, communities surveyed from urban areas relied on labour, self-employment, trade and salaried work but in contrast to the rural host and IDP group, they were not engaged in agriculture.




support and other associated labour activities.

Expenditure

a. Rural host and IDPs


During the reference year there was relative similarity in the proportion of expenditure spent by each wealth group on different commodities and services, with the main exception being the fact that the poorest wealth groups spent a higher proportion of their total expenditure on food. The fact that the better off families also spent a significant amount on food reinforces the fact that their crops were cultivated primarily to be sold for income, and highlights the dependency of all people within the community on markets for food consumption.



Data collected during the assessment also identified rent as a key expenditure during the reference year for the better-off wealth group who resided in larger houses as well as noting that the very poor did not spend on livelihoods inputs due to their reliance on labour for income and an inability to invest in their own productive assets. Zakat does not appear as expenditure presumably due to the fact that Zakat is given in kind.

a. Urban IDPs

During the reference year a significant proportion of expenditure for those in urban areas was spent on rent and utilities, and a substantial investment in trade.



While the proportion of expenditure spent on staple and non-staple food was less for those living in urban areas at the start of the conflict than for the rural host and IDPs group, the total amount spent by urban IDPs on food was actually significantly greater. It is also worth noting that the urban poor's total expenditure was significantly greater than the rural poor's, reflecting expenditure on rent, non-food items and investment made in income generation that was incurred.

Access to markets

As the varied income and food sources indicate, the assessment showed that in the reference year markets were active, diverse and well integrated. Food markets were made up of government-subsidised stores primarily selling cereals and staple food, and unsubsidised 'open' markets. There were also subsidised markets for the sale of primary crops and agricultural inputs.

Markets linked urban and rural areas through the trade of goods, services and labour, and facilitated cross-border trade with Turkey and Lebanon. Livestock and agricultural surplus was sold at peri-urban markets that also provided labour opportunities for many of the very poor and poor, making up around 10% of total casual labour opportunities.

Industrial areas in the cities provided services essential to rural communities such as maintenance and fabrication of agriculture machinery and equipment and irrigation. Investors from the cities were also said to have had large farms and investments in rural areas, particularly cash crops such as olives and fruits and small livestock production.

Key findings

The reference year reflects a time when the conflict had not reached the areas that were assessed and there had been no significant influx of IDPs, in addition the harvest was good and varied with subsidised inputs and irrigation systems still fully operational, while trade and industry were still operating and people were able to move and thus labour opportunities remained.

The bulk of the population in the areas covered by this assessment – both rural host and IDPs, and urban IDPs - fall into the poor or middle income categories, with the very poor, better off and rich households very distinctively separated in the wealth grouping.

In the reference year in the assessed areas, markets were still fully functioning and commodity subsidies continued, and all groups relied on markets for 70% or more of their monthly food.

The reference year data demonstrates the role that agriculture played in the local economy, primarily as a source of income at a local level but also in its role in providing families with food sources and maintaining price stability.

In this period wealth was determined by household's access to skilled and permanent labour opportunities, to livelihoods inputs and to financial capacity to invest in trade.

The poorest households, though primarily labourers adopted a broad number of normal coping strategies such as accessing varied income sources and using the sale of small assets as a safety net.

During the reference period, child labour was rare and where practiced was during the school holidays. Schools were well attended at primary, secondary and tertiary level and there was good access to basic services.



SITUATION SINCE THE REFERENCE YEAR

The areas covered by the assessment have been hit by multiple sporadic shocks in the two years following the reference year, each one of which would have demanded changes to livelihoods strategies. The assessment sought to identify and map these shocks and their impact on livelihoods in order to better plan in the context of on-going instability and understand future risks. Shocks were mapped by community stakeholders and with regard to the issue of inflation also engaged additional market traders.

The assessment captured shocks that fall into a number of categories; economic shocks, shocks directly related to the conflict, shocks indirectly related to the conflict and natural hazards. This information is based on the recall of events by participants and as such serves as an indication and narrative for the purpose of this analysis, and there are thus limitations to this exercise related to participants' ability to recall events over the past two years.

The following provides a summary of the main shocks since the reference year, as identified by the community:

Economic:

- Sudden deflation of Syrian pound against foreign currencies (mid 2012)
- Complete breakdown of government subsidies (second half of 2012)
- Breakdown of supply routes and sources of raw materials leading to closure of the big factories (second half of 2012)
- Massive rise in fuel prices (end of 2012 and start of 2013)

Conflict:

- Massive displacement as a result of barrel bombs (2013) including from rural areas
- Direct airstrikes throughout the timeline affecting different areas, and directly targeting key market places

Natural:

- Drought/insufficient rains lead to complete failure of harvest (2013/2014)

- Crop disease as a result of poor quality imported seed and inputs (on-going)

Fighting across the country has led to huge displacements of people from both rural and urban areas, and massive influxes of IDPs into the assessment area since the reference year. The impact of this on livelihoods for the host community has been to increase competition for decreasing opportunities especially in trade and labour. In addition, those who have fled their homes often did so with little or no assets, or were forced to sell assets they did have including shops and houses at vastly reduced rates which has minimised their long-term coping abilities especially in the context of reduced income generating opportunities.

On-going conflict, specifically airstrikes and barrel bombs, has not only caused a significant loss of assets but also the destruction of infrastructure including importantly, large-scale damage to irrigation systems. This has impacted on agricultural sector and industry as well as access to markets and income generating opportunities as the damage also extends to key community buildings, access roads and market places while frequent airstrikes, road blocks and active conflict have made road travel dangerous and have cut people off from labour opportunities as well as preventing much cross-border trade, which has been exacerbated by increasingly restrictive cross-border access.

The effects of the conflict have been exacerbated by natural shocks; the drought over the most recent cereal-cropping season impacted heavily on rain fed agriculture, and crop disease has also been prevalent over the last two years. In addition to the immediate food and income loss, water shortages have also impacted on household's capacity to care well for livestock, in turn increasing household's likelihood of selling off their livestock. Much of the crop disease, such as wheat rust, is said to be the result of switching to sub-standard imports of seeds and fertilisers, a switch that came about because of the loss of subsidies for agricultural inputs and massive inflation.

Despite the challenges created by mass displacement, IDPs have brought skills and financial capital into the areas where they settled, and in many areas new

businesses opened as a result while the increased population as a result of IDP influxes has also created additional demand for certain products. However, this positive impact has been depleted as families' resources have been diminished and families' purchasing power reduced.

During the assessment focus groups also mentioned the 'positive' impact that armed groups were having on household incomes with armed groups providing some of the most profitable labour opportunities ranging from smuggling to manning road blocks to participating in active conflict. While at the same time in many of the areas where the assessment took place the controlling group has maintained a subsidy structure on key commodities and services similar to that in existence before the conflict that has contributed positively to overall income and expenditure.

Markets

The changes to commodity and service markets since the start of the conflict have been nuanced and complex. Disruption to national commodity subsidies and production, the closure and relocation of many private companies, increased imports, and the influx of humanitarian assistance have all had implications on market linkages, integration and the entry points for livelihoods as well as price volatility, resulting in the use of the dollar as a benchmark for the sale of goods and services.

Due to conflict many large businesses have moved from Aleppo and Idlib to the rural and peri-urban areas controlled by the opposition to mitigate the disruption to business as the danger associated with access roads many of the rural to urban routes to Syrian cities are un-passable. This is also limiting the movement of surplus products within Syria and as such most goods are now coming into the areas assessed are coming in from Turkey, even though these are said to be of lower quality. Though there have been significant changes in 'who' is trading, where people are going to trade and what is being sold, trade is continuing and markets have shown that they are able to respond and adapt to the changing context and demands. Critically, the assessment demonstrated that many goods are still subsidised – what these are

depends on the specific area and the local leadership - and that new markets emerge quickly.

Inflation

Since the reference year there has been hyper-inflation of the Syrian pound. In the reference year the exchange rate was 45 SPY to the \$1, but as of the middle of November 2014 the rate was 190 SPY to the \$1. To understand the inflation of goods and services in northern Syria it is necessary to understand the multiple dimensions underlying this trend, which includes:

1. Changes in demand due to changing priorities, increased humanitarian assistance and decreased purchasing power amongst communities.
2. Increased reliance on imports; and the associated costs of transport and cross-border/import taxation.
3. Subsidies of goods which were significant prior to the conflict have been reduced.

See Annex 2 for overview of price inflation of key commodities since reference year.


Food sources

Since the reference year there have been substantial changes in the food sources of the rural host and IDPs group, especially for the very poor and poor wealth groups. This is due to a number of factors such as the breakdown of commodity subsidies, reduced purchasing power due to inflation and crop harvest failures.


Amongst the rural host and IDPs, the very poor and poor wealth groups have replaced losses in their food sources caused by their current inability to grow crops and a reduction in their purchasing power, with food assistance. The difference between the poor and very poor is that the former are also able to supplement food assistance with food grown in their home gardens which still provide 5% of food for the poor and better off wealth group.

Even though the very poor and poor are receiving food aid they still need to supplement this with food

from markets to meet their dietary requirements; overall the very poor are purchasing 38% of their food, the poor 45% and the better off are purchasing 70% of their food. But the reduction of subsidies on food (and other commodities) is affecting what people are able to afford to buy.




There is no substantial difference between the current food sources of very poor IDPs and poor IDPs from urban areas with both are mainly primarily dependent on humanitarian assistance – making up 52% and 48% of their total food consumption respectively. The better off from the urban IDP group access more than 86% of their food from the market versus 70% for the better off from the mixed rural host and IDP group, and overall the mixed rural host and IDPs have more diversified food source options compared to urban IDPs.



Income sources


Overall the breakdown of income sources has largely remained with some notable exceptions;

- The better off wealth group are no longer receiving salaries.
- The very poor in the rural host and IDP group rely entirely on labour (farm and off-farm), have lost their income from livestock due to the unusual sale of livestock capital as a coping strategy and in response to the lack of available fodder.
- Trade has been significantly affected for the better-off wealth group who have been displaced from urban areas, while conversely the better-off in the rural areas are the least affected because they have the most diversified income sources and expandability options.
- Poor households are no longer accessing loans – which are not available - and the income from crop sales has been lost due to last year's harvest failure, although this loss in income has been partly offset by income gained from petty trade to meet increased local demand from host and IDP communities.



The better-off from the rural communities show stronger resilience because while their income from salaries has been lost, they have been able to expand their income derived from crop sales as they can afford irrigation and the income from the sale of livestock has increased due to the increased sale prices of animal products. Both the poor and better off have shown potential expandability opportunities in trade, crop sales and livestock.

The incomes of the rural very poor have reduced more than the urban very poor likely as a result of increased competition for off-farm labour opportunities as well as the fact that urban IDPs are likely to have more relevant labour skills and experience compared to their counterparts from the rural areas, especially in the market and construction industry.



However, overall income options for urban IDPs are the most limited and shrinking. Unskilled labour, self-employment/skilled labour and trade are the current income sources for urban IDPs, with the very poor urban IDP households receiving 52% of their income through labour and 48% from petty trade. The income sources for the poor remains the same (labour and trade) and loss of salaries compared to the reference year is being offset by self-employment/skilled labour for the better off.

• Labour opportunities

Casual labour (including seasonal labour migration) constitutes an important income source for the very poor and poor IDP and host community households in general. The income from farm and off-farm labour has reduced by 8% and 22% respectively compared to the reference year. Although the wages have increased in response to the national inflation, the number of working days has decreased due to competition, displacement, mobility restrictions, closure of businesses and big factories, and the construction industry being confined to areas that are relatively stable. While daily wages have increased by 42% compared to the reference year (although in some areas where IDPs are concentrated there has been no change), the volume of work has reduced by between 35% and 55% for farm and off-farm labour respectively.

The assessment notes that income from skilled labour and/or self-employment has reduced by 17%, despite the increase in wages by 32% as the volume of work has reduced by 37%. Labour migration to Lebanon is no longer possible due to insecurity of the roads, and internal migration has also been affected. Recently, the people who were working in Ar Raqqa and Deir ez Zor have returned since the coalition airstrikes began against the Islamic State (IS). Communities reported some people migrated to Turkey but that the labour market is now saturated with refugees so this does not offer the same prospects as before.

It is estimated that only 25% of government employees and pensioners are still receiving salaries from the government and for those who are receiving salaries, the basic salary has increased by up to 20%, but at the same time some allowances are no longer included. Where private employment is available, daily rates have increased by 45% but the working days have been reduced by around 15%.

• Agriculture

Income from agriculture and livestock production sales has declined due to several factors: last year's harvest failure reduction of assets and lack of sufficient irrigation olive and wheat infestation and

reduction in the size of cultivated land due to increased prices of all agricultural inputs. The rain fed crop harvest completely failed last year and irrigated crop production reduced by 50%. The secondary impact of this was the reduction in agricultural labour opportunities in the absence of a harvest.

- **Livestock**

Income derived from livestock has also decreased; the very poor have sold/lost their animals while the poor and better off have reduced the size of their herds by 50%. The number and size of dairy farms and small ruminants (goats and sheep) have reduced due to sale in order to cover urgent needs or to feed other livestock holdings, lack of fodder and increased cost of different aspects of animal husbandry. Chicken keeping is a common practice in the community, providing eggs for household consumption as well as income where households have bigger broods but the number of hens has reduced by half due sale and death.

It also now more expensive to keep livestock, and livestock products such as fodder have dramatically increased by 300%. The price increase is attributed to low availability, increased cost of inputs for poultry, lack of fodder due to low precipitation last season, increased cost of power supply and increased veterinary costs. The feed for poultry is imported and is thus more expensive, while insecurity, lack of electricity and unavailability of raw materials has forced almost all the local feed factories to shut down in Idleb and Aleppo governorates.



- **Trade**

According to the assessment, income from market trade has decreased by 14% compared to the reference year. This reduction is attributed to a decrease in demand due to reduced purchasing power, availability of in-kind assistance and the relocation of many businesses.

Key findings

For the purpose of analysis, and in order to quantify the impact of the above mentioned shocks on income sources of the population, the changes in the income

are collected referring to the change in the volume of work / income and the relative value of a unit of that income. So for example, in relation to labour the team looked at the change in the number of days available and the change in the wage per day. For trade the team looked at the change in the volume of trade and the value of that trade, or the change in profit. Each source is calculated, then, by multiplying volume by value to develop the following assumptions. This then enables an understanding of the current income of the various wealth groups following the assumptions that have been used to model the baseline data, which allows for an analysis of the relative resilience of different income sources.



In comparison to the reference year:

- Unskilled off-farm labour income has reduced by 22%
- Farm labour income has reduced by 8%
- Self-employment/skilled labour income has reduced by 17%
- Zakat/Gift income has reduced by 50%
- Income from the sale of crops has reduced by 100% for rain-fed crops but increased by 90% for irrigated crops
- Livestock sale income increased by 50% for the poor and better off, but reduced by 100% for the very poor.
- Income from trade reduced by 14%
- In the current analysis the salary income is calculated as reduced by 100% because only 25% of the rural and 10% of Urban IDPs communities are still receiving government/private salaries.

Applying the mentioned assumptions to the baseline data shows that total household income (amount) has not reduced significantly across rural and urban IDPs in all wealth groups in comparison with the reference year. However, the value of this income has dramatically reduced due to the severe price inflation affecting household purchasing power. Further analysis is illustrated in the expenditure section below.

Expenditure

Since the reference year, household expenditure has dramatically increased due to an increase in the cost of goods caused by hyper-inflation of the Syrian Pound (SYP), increased imports of goods previously produced locally, and increased transportation costs and taxes leading to higher costs of goods and food. Simultaneously the household income has decreased across the wealth groups, leaving a huge expenditure gap.

In order to bridge this gap households are applying a range of coping strategies to reduce expenditure, as well as relying food and non-food distributions and free social services provided by humanitarian actors. For the purpose of analysing the changes in the expenditure, the assessment considered both the volume of items purchased to see changes in spending

patterns, and the cost of items purchased. In order to see overall changes, much like the income analysis, assumptions are formed by multiplying the volume change and price change as a percentage of the baseline data.

Wealth groups	Reduction in household income in comparison to the reference year	
	Rural Host and IDPs	Urban IDPs
V. Poor	-24%	-18%
Poor	-20%	-17%
Better off	-3%	-32%

Table 4: Reduction in household income in comparison to reference year

Wealth groups	Increase in expenditure in comparison to reference year	
	Rural host and IDPs	Urban IDPs
V. Poor	303%	216%
Poor	406%	296%
Better off	312%	359%

Table 5: Increase in expenditure in comparison to reference year

See Annex 3 for an overview of how households have adapted their consumption to mitigate the gap between income and expenditure.

In comparison to the reference year:




- Staple expenditure reduced by 68% for the poor and very poor due to provision of food assistance and increased by 93% for better off.
- Non-staple expenditure increased by 90%
- Basic hygiene materials expenditure increased 16%
- Water same cost but reduced quantity and quality
- Fuel for heating and cooking expenditure increased by 170%
- NFIs increased by 5%

- Utilities reduced by 100% for the very poor and increased by 390% for the poor and better off.
- Livelihood inputs expenditure increased by 50%
- Zakat reduced by 50%
- House rent (reduced by 46% for poor urban IDPs from urban, reduced by 27% for the very poor, but there have been dramatic increases for the better off.)


Ability of households to cover expenditure costs

Rural host and IDP community: Taking humanitarian assistance into account for the very poor, poor and better off, their income gap is estimated at 41%, 49% and 7% respectively. The income gap for the poor is higher than that for the very poor because the poor are spending on agricultural inputs, while the income gap for the better-off is minimal.



The very poor households are able to meet minimum staple food, non-staple food and some of their essential non-food items because they are receiving significant volumes of aid, and benefiting from subsidies of core items. Without this assistance, very poor households could meet 70% of their staple food needs but nothing more, while poor households could meet only their staple food needs but nothing else.



Urban IDPs: Taking humanitarian assistance and coping strategies to reduce consumption into account, all Urban IDP wealth groups are only able to meet their survival and essential expenditure needs, with this group facing added stresses on their income because of house rental costs that remain a significant constraint for IDPs from urban areas but is not noted as an expenditure for rural IDPs and is not a significant cost for host communities, most of whom own their dwellings.



The current income gap for urban IDPs, taking humanitarian assistance and coping strategies into account, for the very poor, poor and better off is estimated at 21%, 37% and 54% respectively. The income gap for the poor is higher than the very poor because the poor need to spend on livelihood inputs, while the income gap for the better off is minimal.



Coping strategies


The data outlined below in the analysis comes from data in all stakeholder groups. Specifically in wealth groups participants were asked to recount coping strategies in the current month, November 2014 and the same month the previous year, November 2013. This data was collected to try to demonstrate changes in vulnerability over time.

Poor and very poor households employ different strategies in order to bridge the gap between income and expenditure needs. This has resulted in a

substantial reduction in consumption, but there is now no further elasticity in households' ability to reduce consumption further and they are resorting to more negative coping mechanisms that may involve further compromising household dietary diversity.


At the same time, very poor and poor households are trying to increase their income through employing detrimental coping strategies that directly affect the well-being of children. The amount of unskilled labour is shrinking, the feasibility of labour migration is decreasing and therefore so are the opportunities to source alternative sources.

Worryingly, there has been an increase in child labour, which is now being conducted outside of the school holidays and is a coping strategy mentioned by all wealth groups. Involvement in armed groups was mentioned in FGDs and across all wealth groups, and entails multiple 'illegal' activities from smuggling, illegal check points and fighting as is seen as a profitable means of supporting household incomes. While in addition early marriage is increasing to relieve expenditure burden, for safety reasons, and in some cases because it is now cheaper.



There are a couple of things of note in the findings of the questions on coping strategies. Firstly that very few communities stated the use of any coping strategies during the month of November 2013, with the exception of borrowing money. This is possible as it followed a reasonable harvest and a period of relative calm in at least half of the assessed villages (according to the hazard timeline). In addition to this the difference in answers between groups is apparent for every coping strategy – building an ever stronger case for location specific analysis.

Of particular concern was the increase in utilisation of three particular coping strategies: child labour, early marriage and involvement in armed groups. All wealth group interviews noted child labour and involvement in armed groups as a current standard means of coping. Where involvement in armed groups was in some cases one of the better paying labour opportunities, engagement in child labour was, for the better off, an opportunity to provide children with further education and skills training.



Save the Children's Food Security and Livelihoods programming in northern Syria

As the conflict in Syria continues families are increasingly struggling to access sufficient food. The loss of families' assets, displacement, an inability to make a living, the destruction of the agricultural sector and rising costs all mean that even where food is available people often cannot afford it.

Save the Children and our partners are working in 35 locations in northern Syria providing more than 171,000 people with regular food parcels. Save the Children is also providing emergency livelihoods support through the provision of agricultural input vouchers to enable families to plant in the winter agricultural season.



CONCLUSIONS

Summary of methodology and limitations

This report has presented the complete findings of the adapted HEA approach in northern Syria. The light HEA tools were complemented by tools aimed at retracing the change in the livelihoods situation for host and IDP populations since the first years of the conflict. This has been conducted through the mapping of hazards and the trending of prices against findings. There are clear limitations in the ability to draw broad conclusions outside of the specific assessed areas and therefore assumptions have been made in an attempt to build a foundation for further analysis.

Household livelihoods, markets and labour – key findings

For a household in the assessed areas, irrespective of wealth group, maintaining reasonable consumption of goods and services has become increasingly difficult over the past two years. There have been multiple and diverse shocks of different magnitudes throughout this period that have resulted in continued movement of people, volatility in prices and shrinking labour opportunities. As well as changes and adaptation at local level, external issues of border closures and a moving conflict have restricted commodity movements and opportunities for migration. The situation is nuanced however: different people are affected, at different times, in different ways and livelihoods strategies have also responded in diverse way.

Trade and commodity markets have demonstrated adaptability in response to a series of cumulative changes including decreased production, increased imports, decreased demands and increased costs, all interlinked with the on-going conflict which have resulted in very high levels of inflation and price volatility across all essential household commodities.

At the same time, new labour opportunities have emerged in response to the crisis, and have presented themselves to those who are able to capitalise on these. Businesses have moved from urban cities to the rural areas, presenting better availability of specific goods and labour, and new skills and trades bought in

by IDPs present opportunities for a small proportion of the community.

More households are increasingly reliant on labour and petty trade as survival strategies however overall the number of available labour days has decreased as unskilled and agricultural labour opportunities have been squeezed. Where labour opportunities are available, daily wages have increased but this has not been commensurate with rates of inflation. In response to households' reduced purchasing power a variety of negative coping mechanisms have emerged across all wealth groups. Child labour was frequently reported during the assessment, even amongst the better off for whom it is used as a form of skills training in the absence of structured educational opportunities, and the use of other coping strategies is also increasingly common including engagement in armed groups, and early marriage.

These trends reflect the reality that both IDP and host poor and very poor households have exhausted their ability to respond to continued shocks and are unable to meet their baseline expenditure requirements despite some humanitarian assistance being available (on which they are fully dependent).

While there are opportunities for adaptation of livelihoods, these are dependent on a household's capital to invest and skills to engage in alternative sources. These opportunities are mainly in trade and skilled labour - which are inhibited by poor infrastructure and electricity - and are opportunities on which humanitarian agencies need to capitalise, whilst acknowledging the context is expected to remain volatile and fluid.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Livelihoods support programming in northern Syria needs to take the following into consideration:

- The protracted and unstable nature of current context requires a focus on protecting and promoting livelihoods resilience. The assessed areas have been hit by multiple and sporadic shocks in the 2 years following the reference year, each one of which would have demanded changes to livelihoods strategies
- The huge loss to the national economy inhibits a return to pre-crisis livelihoods strategies so planning for the short term needs to consider this eventuality. We are entering the typical lean season – if the harvest is good vulnerability will decrease.
- Trade is unavoidably linked to various parties of the conflict. Armed groups are providing some of the most profitable work for the poorest households.
- The situation is nuanced: different people are affected, at different times, in different ways and livelihoods strategies are integrated.

Recommendations for supporting income generation include:

1. Strengthening agricultural productivity:

- Providing temporary labour opportunities for poor households, with a focus on the peak labour season
- On-going support to the agricultural sector – through timely provision of inputs and labour to farming households dependent on the season
- Working with community groups (poor households) to support engagement in new economic activities; for example post-harvest demand offers a good opportunity for new groups
- Supporting the repair of irrigation systems to contribute to agricultural recovery

2. Capitalising on the skills gap in new market opportunities:

- Up-skilling for poor households, e.g. through skills sharing between rural IDPs and the urban poor
- The provision of power and/or grants to middle households to maximise labour opportunities
- Planning for the gap in tertiary education and vocational skills for young people by supporting alternative skills training opportunities

3. Ensuring parallel tracks of immediate assistance and longer-term support:

- Assistance to very poor households should continue and increase in value (particularly during the lean season) to decrease negative and harmful coping strategies.
- A more targeted approach to supporting poor households with food assistance, which should optimally be phased to reduce dependency, either through a change in modality (away from food aid), or increased targeting.
- Market analysis should be continuously updated through regular monitoring of market volumes and price. In turn this should link to flexible modality systems that can be adjusted in line with product availability.
- Livelihoods analysis also needs to be strengthened, acknowledging the variety of strategies for host and IDPs, across urban and rural settings. The response would benefit significantly from coordinated livelihoods analysis, and collaboration to build strengthened inter-agency monitoring tools, that involve community stakeholders in analysis and findings.
- Develop better understanding of changing labour markets, by analysing emerging opportunities for business development, which can be supported by humanitarian and development actors. To contribute to this analysis, agencies should encourage community-level monitoring of labour markets, in terms of both availability of opportunities and wage rates, and should consider further contextually adapted labour assessments.

Annex I

SEASONAL CALENDAR													
Income sources/Activities	Who	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec
Seasons		Winter		Spring			Summer			Autumn			Winter
Rain falls		↑	↑	↓							↓	↓	↑
Agriculture													
Farming		Cumin	Cumin	Veg- Olive	Veg- Olive	Veg		Potato	Potato			Grains - Legumes	Grains – Legume Olive
Crops harvest		Potato	Potato			Barley Legumes	Wheat Cumin					Olive	Olive
Harvest sale		Seeds					Legumes - Cumin	Grains	Grains Grapes	Grapes		Seeds	Seeds
Livestock:													
Livestock sale													
Labour:													
Farming labour				Weeding	Weeding	Harvest	Harvest	Harvest	Harvest	Harvest		Olive harvest↓	Olive harvest↓
Off farm labour	M									↓↓			
Seasonal migration	M			↑	↑					↑	↓	↓	
Child labour	Ch												
Trade:													
Petty trade (fuel, NFIs etc)	M/ Ch												
Small business	M												
Self-employment	M												
Other activities:													
Wild food Collection	W												
Firewood collection	M/W												
Stone mining	M												
Lean season													
Asset Sale													
Asset purchase													

Annex 2

Price inflation of key commodities since reference year

Commodity	Price inflation since the reference year	Attributable determinants
Rice	218%	Rice is an imported good, currently primarily from Turkey. Subject to increased tax and transportation costs and currency inflation
Vegetables	394%	During the baseline year it was rare to import vegetables, now close to 70% of vegetables are imported ¹² .
Meat products	178%	Meat is available locally and distress livestock sales have reduced the price for those who are able to buy.
Fuel	Average 452%	Fuel was heavily subsidised prior to the conflict. There are now fewer refineries, run by armed groups and smuggling is prevalent.
Wheat	247%	Bread remains under subsidy and food aid is keeping prices relatively stable.
Eggs	424%	Egg production has been affected by the closure of chicken farms and fodder factories. The lack of appropriate care available for chickens has reduced supply.

¹²SCI EMMA on tomatoes, March 2014

Annex 3

Overview of how households have adapted their consumption to mitigate the gap between income and expenditure.

Main expenditure	Changes in consumption	Changes in the prices
Staple food	Reduced by 85% (due to food aid) for the very poor and poor Reduced by 8% for the better off	Prices increased by 210%
Non-staple food	Reduced by 50%	Prices increased by 380%
Hygiene materials	IDPs reduced by 60% Host reduced 50%	Prices increased by 210%
Water for drinking and other uses	Same	Same
Cooking fuel	Same consumption but change from Diesel to firewood and Kerosene	Prices increased by 270%
Heating fuel	Same consumption but change from Diesel to firewood and Kerosene	Prices increased by 270%
Household NFIs	Reduced by 50%	Prices increased by 210%
Utilities	Consumption reduced due to power cuts But poor and better off are buying AMP from local generators for lighting and operating basic equipment/devices	Cost reduced by 100% for the very poor (not paying bills) Increased by 490% for poor and better off (poor spend 1,500 and better off spend 2,000 – 3,000 SYP a month).
Livelihood inputs	Cultivated land and herds reduced by 50% (loss, sale, lack of irrigation)	Agriculture inputs prices increased by 300%
Social services	Same	Largely free, provided by humanitarian NGOs.
Zakat/gift	Reduced by 50%	Reduced by 50% due to low harvest
House rent	Increased by 100% (it did not exist for rural IDPs before) Urban poor and very poor IDPs share houses (2-3 per a house).	Poor and very poor IDPs spend 2,900 SYP a month on shared house rent for those who are living outside camps/collective shelters Better off spend on average 8,700 SYP a month on house rent